An Executory Approach To Cross-border Insolvencies by Leibner, Jarred
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 64 
Number 3 Volume 64 Number 3 (April 2010) Article 11 
4-1-2010 
An Executory Approach To Cross-border Insolvencies 
Jarred Leibner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jarred Leibner, An Executory Approach To Cross-border Insolvencies, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1171 (2010) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol64/iss3/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 




I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1171
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING .......................................... 1174
A. The Transnational Insolvency Project ............................... 1174
B. Principles Established by the Transnational Insolvency Project .......... 1176
C. Cases Interpreting the Transnational Insolvency Project ............... 1177
1. THE "MUSCLETECH" CASE ..................................... 1178
2. SUMMARIZING CURRENT U.S-CANADA TRENDS ....................... 1182
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES ................................................. 1185
A. The Dangers of Forum Shopping ................................... 1186
B. Problems With the Current Application of COMI ..................... 1187
C. The Lack of Procedural Uniformity ................................. 1188
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LAWS .................................................. 1190
A. Similarities and Differences ....................................... 1191
B. Unique Solution: Create Internal Consistency By Resolving Circuit Splits. 1192
V . CONCLUSION ........................................................ 1195
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of rapid globalization, it is increasingly important that
the laws of each country are able to settle disputes between parties that
have international implications. There has been much advancement in
the area of international law with the creation of the World Trade Organ-
ization in late 1994.' The WTO agreements are negotiated and signed by
most of the world's trading nations and ratified in their parliaments,
which has enabled disputes to be resolved with fewer opportunities for
parties to block proceedings.2 In addition to the WTO, there are also
* Member of the University of Miami Law Review. J.D. M.B.A. candidate 2011, University
of Miami; B.S. 2006, Purdue University. Special thanks to Professor Redmond for her
encouragement and advice in writing this article and to Nancy Funkhouser for editing. I would
also like to thank Judge Isicoff for the opportunity to serve as her intern last summer in
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, and to my friends and family back home in
Montreal, Quebec.
1. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 21 (9th ed. 2005).
2. Id. ("The Uruguay Round made important advances towards freer trade, not only in the
traditional areas of lower tariffs and fewer nontariff barriers, but in addressing problems of trade
in services, intellectual property, foreign investment and agriculture. It further created new
methods of dispute resolution of trade agreements, making the process more like a judicial than an
arbitral proceeding, and reducing opportunities of parties to block proceedings.").
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more advanced regional developments aimed at fewer member states.3
As between Canada and the United States, these two countries have the
added benefit of being signatories to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which includes Mexico as well.4
In bankruptcy the goal is to maximize the value of the bankruptcy
estate for the benefit of the creditors, while permitting the debtor to get a
fresh start.5 As articulated by the Supreme Court, the purpose is to
"relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness
and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibili-
ties consequent upon business misfortunes."6 This purpose has been
emphasized as being in both public as well as private interest.
7
However, what happens in the case of cross-border insolvency
when it involves two countries with different public policies with respect
to bankruptcy? What about when a debtor has assets in one country, but
files for bankruptcy in another country where it also has assets-which
country's laws govern? When is it appropriate to recognize a judgment
from a foreign court? What if the other country applies a law that causes
an undesirable result and might be regarded as contrary to domestic pol-
icy? When do concerns of comity and overall efficiency take precedence
over state sovereignty or the claims of domestic creditors?
This article addresses the ways in which these problems are cur-
rently addressed and discusses some potential conflict areas that inevita-
bly arise. Adding to the complexity of these issues are substantial
differences in both policy and law that distinguish American bankrupt-
cies from those of other countries.8
This article examines the framework and methods currently being
used in cross-border insolvencies between the United States and Canada
and analyzes several recent cases on both sides of the border. Recent
3. Id. ("There are other international organizations which are of considerable importance to
world or regional trade, but with far more limited membership. They include the organizations
which have been created for the purpose of economic integration, and those which have evolved
with a participation of member nations with similar levels of development and attitudes toward
what international law norms should be.").
4. Id.
5. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
6. Id. (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55. (1915)).
7. See id.
8. See Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and Differences, 11
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367, 367 (2003); Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid
Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 889 (2003)
(suggesting that the U.S. should follow a more similar bankruptcy practice to Canada and parts of
Europe and limit individuals to debt relief through mandatory payment plans); Michael J. White,
Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal
Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 685 (1998) (stating U.S. is
"extremely unusual" in its debtor-friendly stance).
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cases demonstrate the ways in which Canada and the United States have
afforded comity to one another and how this has allowed companies
operating across national boundaries to reorganize successfully. Never-
theless, this article points out that there are still reasons to be concerned
due to inconsistencies in procedural as well as substantive laws between
the two countries.
Part II will look at the framework currently used in handling cross-
border disputes, primarily looking at the policies underlying the Trans-
national Insolvency Project9 and how judicial decisions have promoted
the spirit of cooperation and the policies outlined in the Project. Part III
will discuss the procedural aspects of cross-border insolvencies, in par-
ticular the ways in which the United States recognizes a foreign bank-
ruptcy proceeding differently from Canada which has created some
problems in dealing with jurisdictional issues. Part IV discusses some of
the complications that can arise when substantive laws differ between
the United States and Canadian bankruptcy laws. This section discusses
several fundamental differences between the two countries and will
argue that consistency and harmonization of laws is the best way to pro-
mote trust and efficiency within the realm of cross-border insolvencies.
For instance, this section will demonstrate the burdensome effect of hav-
ing a circuit split with different interpretations regarding the treatment of
executory contracts in a bankruptcy proceeding. While different inter-
pretations may be justified by different policies behind the Bankruptcy
Code, ' circuit splits should be resolved with an overriding policy con-
sideration toward facilitating the operation of international business.
In most of the cases examined in this article, the courts have been
successful in construing the principles of comity and practicality so as to
best serve the interests of all the parties in the long run. While these
types of solutions have recently aided in the successful reorganization of
several companies operating throughout the United States and Canada,
they have also masked some of the underlying fundamental problems
that are bound to reoccur as companies located on both sides of the
border file for bankruptcy. Gradual changes that promote consistency
and reflect the reality of global society are necessary in order to promote
a more stable regime of trust and predictability in cross-border
insolvencies.
9. AM. LAW. INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (2000), http://www.ali.org/ali-old/lnsolvencyPrinciples.pdf.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006).
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
In the normal course of business, a multinational corporation can
make quick decisions and conduct business in multiple countries quite
smoothly and efficiently. However, a bankruptcy filing changes all of
that, and before long a formerly functional business can to turn into a
state of chaos. In a typical international insolvency, different sets of
creditors assert claims to the debtor's assets under the different laws of
each country involved."1 Although the organization has become insol-
vent, it would not be in the interest of anybody to have the business shut
down and its assets liquidated at a price worth only the sum of its parts.
Both domestic and foreign creditors can surely agree on this general
policy. It is for this reason that the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) began an extensive study regarding
achieving higher levels of cooperation in international insolvencies.12
Although no binding legislation has been implemented, UNCITRAL has
approved the Model Law,' 3 which can be understood as an "agreed-upon
international model for domestic legislation."14 The Model law took
over three years to draft and more than thirty-six member states were
involved.15 While the Model Law will be referred to throughout this
article, it is of limited use due to the large number of countries that were
involved.
A. The Transnational Insolvency Project
In contrast, the Transnational Insolvency Project was drafted with
only three countries in mind, yet it also began largely in response to the
increased number of bankruptcies occurring worldwide with interna-
tional implications. 6 "The Principles [from the Project] were developed
specifically for use among the NAFTA countries, but the [American
Law Institute] concluded that they should be applied generally in mul-
tinational bankruptcy cases in United States courts."' 7
The European countries long ago realized that some coordination
11. See The Honourable James M. Farley, Q.C., Globalization and Its Impact on Cooperation
and Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases, American Bar Association Conference (Sept.
24, 2008), at 8 (on file with student author).
12. Id. at 20.
13. U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL), Uncitral Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99V.3(1997)., available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/englishltexts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf.
14. See The Honourable James M. Farley, Q.C., supra note 11, at 20.
15. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, MONOGRAPH2 ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY CASES UNDER CHAPTER 15 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, at 2 (2005).
16. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 713, 713-14
(2005).
17. Id. at 714.
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was necessary in order to manage the risks of default across national
borders.18 Much like the developments in Europe, the goal of the Trans-
national Insolvency Project was to "develop principles and procedures
for managing a cross border insolvency ... having its center of interests
in a NAFTA country and having assets, creditors, and operations in
more than one NAFTA country."' 9 The American Law Institute allo-
cated a number of resources to this Project, which included the participa-
tion of many leading bankruptcy-law experts from each of the three
countries.2"
The Project was divided into two phases, the first's goal being to
achieve a general understanding of the insolvency laws of each of the
three countries involved.2 1 This was accomplished by having each coun-
try put forth an international statement reflecting its respective laws
shaped to speak to an "international audience."2 This was necessary
because the credibility of the Project's recommendations rested upon
"the legitimacy of the drafters and whether they truly represent a con-
sensus of leading experts."23 The goal of the second phase was to
"develop a set of agreed principles governing multinational bankruptcy
cases and to offer useful approaches to managing such cases based on
those principles. ' 24 In other words, the intent behind the Project was to
decide on certain shared values between the three countries and then
interpret the laws of each country with regard to those shared values or
policies.
The initial stages of the Project were quite successful in revealing
substantial similarities between the three legal systems involved. 5 Since
the specific laws of each country were "known factors and were not
greatly different from one another," this regional Project was able to go
a step further than other general global initiatives, such as the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. 26 Despite the high levels of consensus amongst the
NAFTA experts regarding the bankruptcy policies that should be pro-
moted,27 the Project is nevertheless lacking in its goal to influence legis-




22. Id. ("As to each country, they represent a summary of its bankruptcy laws approved by
judges, lawyers, and academics widely recognized as experts in the field.").
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also id. at 7 ("A particular Procedural Principle may be regarded in these
Principles as applicable in a given country if it is permitted under existing law, even if the current




27. See id. at 13.
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lative reforms that would provide for more consistency in the application
of bankruptcy laws between the countries. Perhaps this was because the
Project was slightly conservative in its efforts to draw a balance between
advancing the policies of cooperation while being careful not to make
the proposals too lofty.28 Furthermore, despite the Project's recommen-
dation for both Canada and the United States to adopt the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency in its entirety, 9 this has not yet been done.3°
B. Principles Established by the Transnational Insolvency Project
The proposals of the Project were divided into three sections of
recommendations: 1) general recommendations that include shared val-
ues between the three bankruptcy systems, 2) procedural recommenda-
tions that enable courts to cooperate and communicate under the existing
laws, and 3) recommendations for new legislation or international agree-
ments.31 Although the Project has not been successful in generating
many legislative reforms, the Project has been very influential with
respect to the general and procedural recommendations.32 Rather than
create any new body of law, these recommendations set forth common
objectives as well as "best practices" under current law. 33 The recom-
mendations leave open the issue of implementation to the legislators of
each individual country.34
The Project yielded seven general principles and twenty-seven pro-
cedural principles that were agreed upon by each NAFTA country. 35 The
first general principal is that courts and administrators should cooperate
with the "goal of maximizing the value of the debtor's worldwide
assets. '36 The second is that recognition should be granted as quickly
and inexpensively as possible in each of the other NAFTA countries
with minimal legal formalities.3 7 The third is that bankruptcy coopera-
tion requires the automatic stay to take effect at the earliest possible time
in each country where the debtor has assets. 38 The remaining general
28. Id. at 3 ("[T]he Project has conscientiously attempted to draw a proper balance between
advancing common values in a spirit of cooperation to the maximum extent possible, while being
cautious to restrict its proposals to those that are realistic at the current stage of development of
legal relationships within the NAFTA.").
29. Id. at 14.
30. See infra Part 11I.C.
31. See AM. LAW. IINs-., supra note 9, at 2.
32. See id. at 6-12.
33. Id. at 3.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 6-12.
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recommendations include the free exchange of information to be
obtained from each proceeding, the sharing of assets on a worldwide
basis where appropriate, and the absence of discrimination against debt-
ors and creditors alike.39
The procedural recommendations are more specific and are prima-
rily designed to ensure that domestic creditors are not treated favorably
or unfavorably and that foreign proceedings can be recognized promptly
except when "manifestly contrary to public policy."40 Some of the par-
ticular provisions include but are not limited to the topics of structure,
recognition, reconciliation of automatic stays, abusive filings, court
access, communication, asset transfers, notice, cooperation, coordina-
tion, cross-border sales, avoidance actions, postpetition financing,
claims, priorities, treatment of subsidiaries, as well as any discharges."
For example, Procedural Recommendation 20 states that "where there
are parallel proceedings, administrators should attempt to agree upon a
common position concerning the avoidance of any prebankruptcy trans-
actions involving the debtor.
4 2
The procedural principles can also serve as a good indication of
where substantive laws can be reformed.43 The final section of the Pro-
ject recommends that each NAFTA country should adopt legislation that
is consistent with the general and procedural principles.44 The elimina-
tion of unnecessary circuit splits, as this article encourages, would
greatly facilitate this objective and promote the Project's recommenda-
tions. It would be far easier for U.S. laws to achieve greater harmoniza-
tion with their NAFTA counterparts if there were greater harmonization
of bankruptcy laws in the United States.
C. Cases Interpreting the Transnational Insolvency Project
As some of the recent cases will demonstrate, the Transnational
Insolvency Project has provided helpful guidance in terms of administer-
ing a cross-border bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there is no way of predict-
ing whether a given court will be willing to accommodate a foreign
insolvency proceeding or recognize the orders of another jurisdiction if
39. See id.
40. See id. at 7-8 ("Recognition of a proceeding in another NAFFA country should be
granted as quickly as possible."); see also infra Part II.C.I (discussing the concept of manifestly
contrary to public policy in regards to the Muscletech case).
41. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 9, at 7-12.
42. Id. at 11.
43. See id. at 7 ("If the laws of a given country are inconsistent with a Procedural Principle,
these inconsistencies were mentioned in the Country Notes that accompany that Principle in hope
of eventually achieving legislative reform.").
44. See id. at 13.
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they are somewhat inconsistent with domestic policies. How much will
the effect on domestic creditors influence a ruling? Would it matter if
GM were the largest unsecured creditor in the case rather than a closely
held corporation? In several recent cases, there has been a lot of com-
promising and good will amongst the parties involved.45 Courts have
been willing to extend comity and promote the overall goals and values
agreed upon in the Transnational Insolvency Project. As these recent
cases will demonstrate, a great deal of cooperation can be achieved
through increased communication, flexibility, and technological
sophistication.
1. THE "MUSCLETECI" CASE
The Muscletech decision46 was a major step forward in advancing
the relationship between the United States and Canada in regards to the
joint administration of a cross-border insolvency. The facts of the case
demonstrate some of the complications that can arise when a company
operating in both sides of the border files for bankruptcy. Among the
most important issues under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,47
which deals with cross-border insolvencies, is determining whether to
recognize a foreign proceeding and whether an automatic stay should be
granted.48 The court may grant appropriate relief to a foreign debtor in
order to "protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the credi-
tors. '' 49 However, "[n]othing in this chapter prevents the court from
refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States."50 Mus-
cletech involved the issue of whether the actions taken by the Canadian
bankruptcy court were "manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy" so as
to prevent the foreign proceeding from being recognized.
The facts of the case are as follows: "Before the substance known
as ephedra was banned by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in
2004, a Canadian-based company Muscletech marketed and sold prod-
ucts containing ephedra in the United States."' I "Some of the consumers
suffered severe injuries, such as heart attacks and strokes, and eventually
more than thirty civil actions were filed for personal injuries and wrong-
45. See, e.g., In re Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (2000) (Canadian
bankruptcy court granting recognition to a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, despite the fact that the
particular debtor would not have even qualified for protection under Section 18.6 of the CCAA).
46. See In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
47. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2006).
48. See § 1521.
49. See § 1521.
50. See § 1506.
51. In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. at 334.
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ful deaths allegedly caused by ephedra. ' 52 As a result of the lawsuits,
Muscletech filed for bankruptcy in the Ontario Superior Court, under the
CCAA.53
In the Canadian proceeding, the parties negotiated a Claims Resolu-
tion Procedure that was "designed to speedily assess and value all credi-
tor claims, including the claims of the plaintiffs in the Muscletech
actions in the United States. . .. "' The problem arose when Muscletech
moved for an order recognizing and enforcing the Claims Procedure in
the United States pursuant to sections 1521 and 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 5 Four claimants opposed the motion, "arguing that it is mani-
festly contrary to the public policy of the United States in that it deprives
the objectors of due process and trial by jury."56 Judge Rakoff raised the
issue as to whether these four parties may have waived their objection
by also making these same arguments in the Ontario Court. 7
Although Judge Rakoff did not rule on this issue, the claimants'
motion was denied nonetheless because the Canadian Claims Resolution
Procedure was not "manifestly contrary" to public policy.58 "In adopting
Chapter 15, Congress instructed the courts that the exception provided
therein for refusing to take actions 'manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States' should be narrowly interpreted. '59 The court
stated that "[t]his is the standard meaning accorded to the word 'mani-
festly' in international law when it refers to a nation's public policy. '"60
The claimants argued that the Canadian proceeding should not be recog-
nized because it violates the untouchable U.S. constitutional right to a
52. Id.
53. See id.; see also Sheryl Seigel, Lang Michener LLP, Distinctions with a Difference:
Comparison of Restructurings Under CCAA with Chapter II Law and Practice, at 2, available at
http://www.langmichener.ca/uploads/content/LM%20LLP%2ODistinctions%20with%20a%2ODif
ference%20022808%20final-revised.pdf ("In Canada, restructurings are accomplished using the
provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") or the Companies' Creditors
Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). There are far fewer legislative provisions relating to restructurings
under the BIA and CCAA than under Chapter 11, leaving many significant issues to be defined
and refined by jurisprudence.").
54. In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. at 334 ("by that time the [U.S. plaintiffs] had
filed claims and otherwise appeared in the Ontario insolvency proceeding.").
55. See id.
56. Id. at 335.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 336 ("[The] word 'manifestly' in international usage restricts the public policy
exception to the most fundamental policies of the United States. ") (quoting H.R.Rep No.
109-31(I), at 109, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172); see also Louks v. Standard Oil
Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) ("We are not so provincial as to say that every
solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.").
60. Id.
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jury trial.61
Ultimately, the court rejected these arguments and enforced the
Claims Resolution Procedure put into place by the Ontario Superior
Court.62 Judge Rakoff further stated that "the notion that a fair and
impartial verdict cannot be rendered in the absence of a jury trial defies
the experience of most of the civilized world. 63 Even England, where
the jury concept began, limits its jury trials in civil proceedings to those
cases that involve allegations of "libel, slander, malicious prosecutions,
false imprisonment, and fraud."' By recognizing the Canadian proceed-
ing, the United States provided a reassuring signal to many global com-
panies that were conducting business in the United States. A contrary
decision might have caused crippling effects to certain industries that are
commonly exposed to tort or class-action litigations in the United States.
Chapter 15 seeks to advance many of the comity-based objectives
of the Model Law and the Transnational Insolvency Project.65 For exam-
ple, it states that U.S. Courts "shall cooperate to the maximum extent
possible with a foreign court or foreign representative," and "shall con-
sider the international origin of the insolvency, and the need to promote
an application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of
similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions. 66
Under Chapter 15, the type of relief available to a foreign debtor
depends on whether they are recognized as a foreign main proceeding or
a foreign nonmain proceeding.67 The most notable difference between
the two types is that if the proceeding is recognized as a foreign main
proceeding, then U.S. creditors of the foreign debtor will automatically
be subject to the broad automatic stay of section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code.6 8
In order to qualify as a foreign main proceeding and receive the
protections under the Code, the foreign debtor must demonstrate that the
jurisdiction where they filed for bankruptcy is in fact their center of
61. See id. at 337. The claimants also argued that the right to a jury is further enhanced in the
context of personal injury cases by 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (a).
62. See In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. at 337.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism Into a
Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMp. L. 709, 712-13 (2005)).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2006). This section incorporates most of the preamble of the Model
Law verbatim.
66. See §§ 1526, 1508 (emphasis added).
67. See § 1517(b).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006); see also § 1520 (a)(3) ("Unless the Court orders otherwise,
the foreign representative may operate the debtor's business and may exercise the rights and
powers of a trustee.").
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main interests ("COMI.") 69 In making this determination, Chapter 15
presumes that the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the
case of an individual, is the debtor's COMI "in the absence of evidence
to the contrary."7 ° The presumption is a rebuttable one, subject to the
interpretation under the Federal Rule of Evidence 301.1'
This test is a very important aspect of international insolvencies and
can have a major effect on the outcome of a case.72 Although COMI is
not defined,73 it has been said to "generally equate with the concept of a
'principal place of business' in United States law."74 If a foreign pro-
ceeding fails the COMI test and is classified as a nonmain proceeding
rather than a main proceeding, then the foreign representative will only
be granted relief if the court is "satisfied that the relief relates to assets
that, under the law of the United States, should be administered in the
foreign nonmain proceeding or concerns information required in that
proceeding."75
Another contentious issue in the Muscletech restructuring was
whether Canada or the United States was the debtor's COMI. In order
for the Canadian proceeding to be recognized under Chapter 15 as for-
eign main proceeding, it was necessary that Judge Rakoff make this
finding. On March 2, 2006, Judge Rakoff expressly accepted the Ontario
court's finding that the debtor's COMI was in Canada, despite the fact
that Muscletech sold a substantial portion of its products in the United
States and had actively been defending litigation in the United States
7 6
The court stated that the following were several of the factors that
were essential to the finding: 1) "[t]he business was carried on primarily
in Canada, and the principals, directors, and officers of the Applicants
are residents of Ontario," 2) the debtors' registered mailing addresses
were almost all in Canada, 3) the debtors had no physical place of busi-
ness in the United States with the exception of a warehouse facility, 4)
69. See §§ 1516, 1520. This classification will ultimately determine whether a foreign
proceeding is entitled to relief automatically (main), versus available only under the further
discretion of the U.S. judge (nonmain).
70. See § 1516.
71. See In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 635 (2006).
72. See discussion infra Part III.
73. See Carfagnini J.A., Recent CCAA and Cross-Border Developments in MuscleTech and
Calpine Canada Restructuring, at 131 ("Prior to the Muscletech case, there had been essentially
no North American judicial determinations as to the meaning of the term 'centre of main
interests,' which is not defined in chapter 15 or anywhere else in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
despite its central use and importance.").
74. See Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (describing the two tests commonly employed to determine a corporation's principal place
of business).
75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1521(c) (2006).
76. See Carfagnini, supra note 73, at 133.
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the decision-making and control of the company was in Canada, and 5)
the debtors' banking and administrative functions were conducted by
Canadian employees in the province of Ontario.77
The District Court's holding that the CCAA was entitled to recog-
nition as a foreign main proceeding, as well as its determination that the
Canadian Claims Resolution Procedure was not manifestly contrary to
U.S. public policy, were both essential for the survival of Muscletech.
By eliminating the absolute requirement for a jury trial and by allowing
the CCAA to have primary jurisdiction over the case, the U.S. court was
able to facilitate the successful reorganization of Muscletech, a company
operating on both sides of the border.
2. SUMMARIZING THE CURRENT U.S.-CANADA TRENDS
In addition to the recommendations and policy-oriented Principles
discussed above, the three NAFTA countries also approved the Guide-
lines Applicable to Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases
("Guidelines").78 Although the Muscletech case demonstrates a signifi-
cant degree of comity and cooperation that can be achieved between the
two countries, there are certainly still reasons to be concerned. Much of
the success regarding the Transnational Insolvency Project as well as the
implementation of the Guidelines has been dependent on the flexible and
active roles played by individual judges.7 9 The Canadian courts have
also displayed cooperation and flexibility in several recent cross-border
cases. One Canadian court demonstrated this flexibility in the bank-
ruptcy of Archibald Candy Corporation, where it implemented the
Guidelines in order to facilitate cooperation and communication with the
U.S. court.80
In January 2004, Archibald Candy Corporation filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 even though Archibald Canada was still growing and
77. See id.
78. AM LAW. INST., supra note 9, at app. 2 ("These Guidelines are intended to enhance
coordination and harmonization of insolvency proceedings that involve more than one country
through communications among the jurisdictions involved ... These Guidelines encourage such
communications while channeling them through transparent procedures. The Guidelines are meant
to permit rapid cooperation in a developing insolvency case while ensuring due process to all
concerned. The Guidelines at this time contemplate application only between Canada and the
United States, because of the very different rules governing communications with and among
courts in Mexico. Nonetheless, a Mexican Court might choose to adopt some or all of these
Guidelines for communications by a sindico with foreign administrators or courts."); see also
Matlack Inc., Re, No. 01-CL-4109 (Ont.Sup. C.J. 2001), 9-38, available at 2001 O.T.C. LEXIS
2324.
79. See, e.g., In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig. 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
80. See In re Archibald Candy (Canada) Corp., Ontario Court of Justice, File No.
04-CL-5461, July 27, 2004.
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profitable throughout much of Canada.8t Later that year, with the aid of
interim receiver Laura Secord to facilitate the cross-border insolvency
process, 82 the parties sought the court's approval to conduct a sale of
assets.83 The process was complicated by the fact that the U.S. parent
company owned some critical assets, including intellectual property, as
well as the fact that Canada does not normally follow the "stalking
horse" bidding process that the United States is accustomed to. 84 In
order to solve this problem, the United States and Canadian courts con-
ducted a joint hearing held by video conference, and the Canadian court
eventually approved the U.S.-style bidding process as well as the asset
sale.85
This example displays many of the benefits of cooperation and
coordination in a cross-border bankruptcy, including the "gesture of
comity" shown by the Canadian court in participating in a "U.S. style
bidding process."86 Nevertheless, despite the enormous benefits of such
judicial cooperation, we are a far cry away from a regime of predictabil-
ity or stability. For example, another Canadian court might have refused
to approve the sale, if it found that the U.S. sale was overly prejudicial
to Canadian creditors or violated domestic policy. After all, asset sales
are conducted much differently in Canada than in the United States.87
In the foreign bankruptcy context, the primary policy consideration
in determining whether a U.S. court should extend comity to a bank-
ruptcy court from another jurisdiction is whether the foreign court shares
our "fundamental principle that assets be distributed equally among
creditors of similar standing."88 The U.S. courts must also "guard
81. See The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note 11, at 44.
82. Archibald Canada carries on its business under the name Laura Secord. Laura Secord was
appointed as interim receiver by the Ontario Court to facilitate the insolvency process of the
parent company. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id; see also Cozier, The Stalking Horse in Cross-border Insolvency Sales: Canada
Saddles Up, 23-9 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2004) ("[T]he court-supervised auction of assets
between a stalking-horse purchaser and other bidders has been atypical of Canadian insolvency
proceedings. By contrast, the traditional method of asset sales by an insolvent Canadian debtor is a
process where all potential purchasers are encouraged to submit their highest and best offers
before a fixed deadline. Generally, the practice is to administer the process to ensure that bidders
are not provided with particulars of competing offers before the bid deadline. After the successful
bidder is selected and subject generally to court approval, the sales process is concluded.
Overbidding or re-bidding among the participating bidders has generally not been condoned by
the Canadian courts, and after the conclusion of the bidding process, the successful bid is rarely
replaced by another, even if the later bid is higher.").
85. See In re Archibald Candy Corp., Ontario Superior Court of Justice, File No. 04-CL-
5461, June 29, 2004; see also The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note I1, at 44.
86. See id.
87. See Cozier, supra note 84, at 30.
88. See Remington Rand Corp. v. Bus. Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1271 (3d Cir. 1987)
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against forcing American creditors to participate in foreign proceedings
in which their claims will be treated in some manner inimical to this
country's policy of equality."89 Often times, reasonable judges may dif-
fer in their assessment of whether a foreign judgment is contrary to
domestic policies. For example, in Philadelphia Gear. Corp.,90 Judge
Roth agreed that comity should be extended to a Mexican proceeding
regarding assets located in the United States, yet nevertheless disagreed
with the view of the majority that comity should be afforded with
respect to the attachment of foreign assets as well. 9'
In Canada, one judge who has been willing to provide flexible solu-
tions in a cross-border insolvency is Justice Farley, who has demon-
strated his willingness to accommodate U.S. bankruptcy proceedings
nearly at all costs. 92 For example, in In re Babcock & Wilcox,93 Justice
Farley granted relief to a solvent entity that was actually not even eligi-
ble to seek insolvency protection under section 18.6 of the CCAA. 94 In
reaching his conclusion to recognize certain U.S. orders, Justice Farley
held that respect ought to be accorded to the "overall thrust" of the for-
eign bankruptcy laws, "unless in substance generally it is so different
from the bankruptcy and insolvency law of Canada or perhaps because
the legal process that generates the foreign order diverges radically from
the process here in Canada."95 He also stated that the enterprise should
be able to "implement a plan so as to reorganize as a global unit, espe-
cially where there is an established interdependence on a transnational
basis," or where one jurisdiction can administrate the case effectively on
its own. 9 6 In considering the appropriate level of his involvement, Jus-
(granting comity to Dutch bankruptcy proceedings, but only if and to the extent that the Dutch
court is willing to recognize the American judgment in its proceedings).
89. See id. (citing Banque De Financement S.A. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 568 F.2d 911,
921 (2d Cir. 1977)).
90. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 194 (3d
Cir. 1994) (Roth, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 194-95 (Roth, J., dissenting) (arguing the district court would not have abused
its discretion if it had decided that comity did not preclude it from deciding a summary judgment
motion).
92. See, e.g., In re Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (2000).
93. Id.
94. See id; see also The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note 11, at 31-33 ("Babcock &
Wilcox, which filed for bankruptcy protection in Louisiana largely as a result of the weight of
asbestos litigation ... had an operating subsidiary in Canada ("B&W Canada") which was
neither part of the Chapter 11 case nor apparently insolvent. Because claims against the parent
(but not B&W Canada) were stayed, there was a risk that the parent's creditors might advance
claims against B&W Canada based on alter ego or similar theories. Further, Canadian creditors
and, perhaps, even some Canadian courts might not have recognized a stay of proceedings under
Chapter II if B&W Canada had been included in that filing (assuming there had been jurisdiction
to do so).").
95. See Farley, supra note 11, at 32.
96. See id.
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tice Farley believes that it should vary depending on the case and that an
important factor is the court's "nexus to that enterprise." 97
Nevertheless, despite the flexibility of Justice Farley, not all Cana-
dian judges have been willing to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceed-
ings nor does the law require them to do so. 98 Furthermore, the
successes achieved by Justice Farley might only have been achieved in
part because of the cooperation of the creditors involved.99 For example,
the Canadian creditors in Babcock & Wilcox did not even challenge or
object to the automatic stay that was in place for several years through-
out the duration of the main proceedings that were taking place in the
United States. 00
While this has contributed to the successful implementation of
many cross-border solutions, it has also masked many of the problems
that are bound to reoccur in the future.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Perhaps most problematic of the differences in the legal systems of
the NAFTA countries are the procedural discrepancies regarding how a
foreign judgment is recognized. Without any effective treaty or binding
legislation, the choice in procedural posture in cross-border insolvency
is either the concurrent/parallel model or the primary/secondary
model.' 0 ' A primary/secondary jurisdiction model is when there is "a
filing in the primary jurisdiction where the debtor's central operations
are located and subsequent secondary filings in jurisdictions where other
assets are located."10 2 Under the concurrent/parallel jurisdiction model,
the debtor would file full proceedings in all jurisdictions where key
assets are located.1
0 3
According to Justice Farley, both models have created several con-
ceptual difficulties that have resulted in forum shopping."m Some of
these problems have included: 1) businesses more frequently opting to
locate their offices in jurisdictions that are inconvenient for their credi-
tors, 2) global reorganization attempts where the first case to be filed is
97. See id. at 33.
98. See, e.g., Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V., 3 C.S.R. 907 (2001)
(affirming the trial court's discretion to refuse to automatically recognize a Belgian bankruptcy
order).
99. See The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note 11, at 33. One of the great things about
bankruptcy law is that it encourages creditors to make concessions because it is in the best interest
of all the parties to preserve the going concern value of the company.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 6.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 6-7.
104. See id. at 7.
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in a secondary jurisdiction, and 3) courts of individual countries reluc-
tant to concede authority especially if it is at the expense of domestic
creditors. 0 5
A. The Dangers of Forum Shopping
Currently, the United States is one of the most debtor-friendly
countries in terms of bankruptcy laws. ' 6 Even Canada, whose laws are
very similar, does not offer as much relief to its debtors under the
CCAA. 11 7 For example, under the CCAA a stay against creditors must
be granted by the court, while in the United States it is automatic.
10 8
Also, under the CCAA there are no cramdown provisions, 0 9 and thus it
is almost impossible for a debtor to confirm a plan if there are dissenting
creditors. 110
As a result of this disparity, the leverage and bargaining power of
the parties in bankruptcy differ depending on which country will be
deemed the primary jurisdiction. Given this incentive, it is no secret that
many troubled foreign entities will prefer the U.S. bankruptcy laws to
those of their home country." 1 Adding to this issue is the low threshold
regarding eligibility under the U.S. Code that merely requires a debtor to
own "property" in the United States." 2 This requirement has been
described as being "virtually no barrier to having federal courts adjudi-
cate foreign debtors' bankruptcy proceedings.""' 3 Furthermore, unlike
105. See id.
106. See Michael J. White, supra note 8 (stating that the U.S. is "extremely unusual" in its
debtor-friendly stance).
107. See DOUGLAS R. EMERY, JOHN D. FINNERTY, AND JonN D. STOWE, CORPORATE
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 800 (3d ed. 2005).
108. See id.
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006). Cramdown provisions provide a means for dealing with
dissenting creditors who may or may not be voting on a plan in bad faith.
110. See Douglas R. Emery et. al, supra note 107, at 800 ("There is no cramdo~vn or other
means of dealing with dissenting creditors. A proposed plan of reorganization must be approved
by two-thirds in value and a majority in number of the members of each class, including
unaffected classes. If it is rejected by any class, the stay is lifted and creditors are free to move
against the debtor to collect on their loans.").
11. See, e.g., In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. I (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Columbia's counterpart to chapter II would have prevented the debtor from
rejecting burdensome leases and would have allowed a lessor to apply for termination of the
reorganization, repossess the property, and force the debtor into liquidation if default payments
were not cured within ninety days of filing.").
112. See II U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
113. See Globo Comunicacoes, No. 04 Civ. 2818(VM), 2004 WL 2624866, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.,
Dec. 23, 2004); see also Erin K. Healy, All's Fair in Love and Bankruptcy? Analysis of the
Property Requirement for Section 109 Eligibility and its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 535 (2004). The grounds for dismissing a
foreign filing are bad faith, substantial abuse, and abstentation. Id. at 548. Healy argues that
judges need to enforce these provisions stringently rather than creating new ones in order to
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many other countries, the United States does not impose a reciprocity
requirement on a foreign debtor whose country has not enacted the
Model Law. 14 Thus, debtors from potentially more countries have
access to U.S. bankruptcy laws.
If the U.S. courts do not properly address abusive filings by foreign
debtors, the United States will inevitably lose the support of the interna-
tional business community." 5 If companies are unable to determine the
risks of conducting business, this will increase the required rate of return
on a given investment which will reduce the overall level of multina-
tional business transactions. This would have terrible consequences on
the U.S. economy because lenders and investors would no longer be
willing to conduct business.
B. Problems With the Current Application of COMI
When it comes to recognizing the automatic stay of a foreign court,
the COMI test is decisive." '6 The test originates in Europe where there is
much more extensive case law on point because most insolvency laws in
Europe are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.' 17 Although the
COMI test does provide some useful frameworks in determining juris-
diction, there are many flaws with the test itself as well as in the lack of
COMI's uniform application among the NAFTA countries." 8 In a fairly
recent article, Lynn LoPucki, a professor at UCLA Law School, explains
his concerns that the UNCITRAL Model Law and the COMI test are
universalist concepts that are both "intentionally vague and practically
meaningless" in application. " 9
The universalism that LoPucki criticizes refers to the international
bankruptcies where the court of one country, the debtor's "home coun-
try," applies its own laws and controls the company's bankruptcy world-
wide. '2 LoPucki argues that multinational companies do not always
have a home country in any meaningful sense, and has challenged the
prevent foreign debtors from abusing the system. Id. at 560. Since "the outcome under the laws of
the debtor's home country may be drastically different than the result under the Code," one option
that Healy proposes in order to ensure some predictability is for parties to "agre[e] upon the
outcome of bankruptcy proceedings in advance of the event occurring." Id. However, while this
may protect a party's right to recover damages, it "cannot prevent a debtor from establishing
eligibility and utilizing the Code." Id.
114. See Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, Overview of Chapter 15 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border
Cases, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269, 271 (2008) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 113 (2005), as
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 175-76).
115. See Erin K. Healy, supra note 113, at 560.
116. See 11. U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (2006).
117. See Carfagnini, supra note 73, at 133 n.41.
118. See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 114, at 278.
119. See Lynn LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 143 (2005).
120. See id.
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universalists to answer the following three questions regarding the appli-
cation of COMI: 1) which country is the "home country" when the prin-
cipal assets and operations are located in a different country from the
headquarters or the place of incorporation, 2) does "home country" refer
to the home country of each individual corporation or does it refer to the
country of the corporate group, and finally 3) what laws will govern
when the location of the home country has changed after credit has
already been extended? 2 '
Until these questions can be answered, credit extenders will not
know which country's laws will govern a particular bankruptcy case.
122
Not only does this result create havoc and uncertainty, but it will also
lead to more forum shopping and abusive behavior on the part of
debtors.
C. The Lack of Procedural Uniformity
In comparing the procedural aspects between the two countries, one
notable difference pops out immediately. Unlike the United States,
Canada has not yet formally adopted the Model Law. 2 3 This is strange
considering that Canada participated actively in the development of the
Model Law and even recommended its implementation in the Transna-
tional Insolvency Project. 2 4 This might signal some confusion to the
international community despite the fact that Canadian laws generally
support the spirit of cooperation.
25
In the United States, Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code has incor-
porated most of the Model Law, but it also contains some unique varia-
tions that can lead to abuses as well as hardships for certain foreign
debtor representatives. 126 Under Chapter 15, the vast majority of rights
and benefits are not unavailable until after the entry of an order granting
recognition of the foreign proceeding. 27 In addition, the court will rec-
ognize a foreign proceeding only if the proceeding is classified as either
a foreign main proceeding or a foreign nonmain proceeding (i.e. where
the debtor has an "establishment"). 1
28
Although Chapter 15's definition of "establishment" is broader than
the one incorporated by the Model Law, it also may have the effect of
preventing a foreign representative from obtaining relief if the underly-
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note 11, at 28.
124. Id.; see also id. at 13.
125. See id. at 29; See also supra Part I1.C.2.
126. See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 114, at 270.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 284. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1502(7) (2006).
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ing foreign proceeding cannot be recognized itself.' 29 This "establish-
ment" requirement has been labeled harsh and has created controversy in
some recent cases involving hedge funds in the Cayman Islands.
30
For instance, in Bear Stearns, 13 1 the debtor was unable to obtain
recognition in the United States as either a foreign main or a foreign
nonmain proceeding. In addition to not satisfying the COMI test,
32
Judge Lifland held that the Bear Steams hedge funds' "contact with, and
business conducted in the Cayman Islands" were not enough to support
a finding of an "establishment," and thus could not be recognized as
nonmain proceedings either. 133 As a result, no relief was available to this
debtor under Chapter 15.
In contrast, Judge Drain from the Southern District of New York
was much more willing to recognize a foreign proceeding as a nonmain
without the strict "establishment" requirement. 134 Still, there is much
uncertainty regarding whether and when relief will be granted to foreign
debtors. Some commentators have argued that pre-BAPCPA comity
cases as well as common-law principles provide the requisite authority
to grant relief in certain instances.
13 5
The United States establishment requirement has also impacted
consumer-bankruptcy cases where a foreign debtor moves to the United
States subsequent to having filed for bankruptcy in their home coun-
try. 136 Since the debtor has now moved to the United States, it would no
longer have an "establishment" in the foreign jurisdiction where it origi-
nally filed for purposes of obtaining recognition as a foreign nonmain
proceeding under the Code. Furthermore, the debtor no longer lives in
the foreign country and so cannot obtain recognition as a main proceed-
ing either. 137 As a result, such an individual will be denied the protec-
129. See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 114, at 278-79. This result is different than
contemplated under the UNCITRAL Model Law.
130. See, e.g, In re Bear Steams High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd.,
374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
131. See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd., 374
B.R. at 131.
132. This would have enabled the debtor to obtain recognition as a foreign main proceeding.
133. See id. at 131 (refusing to grant recognition).
134. See In re Sphinx Ltd., 351 B.R. 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing a proceeding as
a foreign nonmain proceeding in similar circumstances, without focusing on whether the debtor in
that case had an establishment in the Cayman Islands that actually met the test for recognition of a
foreign nonmain proceeding).
135. See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 114, at 304 n.178 (citing Gabriel Moss, Mystery of the
Sphinx - COMI in the US, 20 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 4, 6 (2007)).
136. See, e.g., Lavie v. Ran, 384 B.R. 469, 471 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008) (refusing to recognize
an Israeli bankruptcy proceeding as either main or a nonmain proceeding where the debtor moved
to and lived in Texas since 1997).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006).
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tions of the automatic stay (or any other relief) for their assets located in
the United States.
138
Although Canada has not explicitly incorporated the Model Law, it
is more flexible than the United States in terms of granting recognition
to foreign proceedings.' 39 For example, Canada will not require that the
debtor have an "establishment" in the jurisdiction where they first filed
in order to be granted recognition as a nonmain proceeding.
140
Despite some shortcomings and imperfections with the Model Law,
Canada should nevertheless formally adopt it, while the United States
should eliminate their strict "establishment" requirement for good-faith
foreign debtors looking to obtain recognition as a foreign nonmain pro-
ceeding. By adopting identical versions of the Model Law, many proce-
dural obstacles can be eliminated in cases involving the United States
and Canada, and better predictability can be achieved for all parties
involved. The inconsistent applications in this area should be addressed
by both countries in order to prevent a large amount of forum shopping
as well as unnecessary litigation over venue.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LAWS
So far, this article has talked about some of the procedural
problems that arise in cross-border insolvencies, including whether and
when recognition is granted to a foreign proceeding. But what are some
of the consequences when substantive laws differ between two coun-
tries? How much can a bankruptcy proceeding under the CCAA differ
from a filing under the Code? This section looks briefly at the substan-
tive laws of Canada and the United States and demonstrates that differ-
ences between the two systems may lead to problematic applications. In
addition, because Canada often looks to the U.S. Code for guidance in
forming interpretations under its laws,14 1 this section also demonstrates
that inconsistent application of laws and circuit splits within the United
States can lead to troublesome results in a cross-border insolvency. In
conclusion, it is possible to advance the aims of comity and predictabil-
ity without requiring drastic legislative reform by interpreting circuit
splits and unresolved issues in the Bankruptcy Code with regard to the
international implications that may potentially emerge.
138. See Lavie v. Ran, 384 B.R. at 471.
139. See Seigel, supra note 53, at 12 ("[a]s contrasted with Section 1506 of Chapter 15 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which imposes an arguably higher threshold by the use of the phrase
"manifestly" contrary to the public policy of the United States.").
140. See id.
141. See infra Part IV.A.
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A. Similarities and Differences
There are already so many challenges in a typical cross-border
insolvency that having to deal with different laws in different jurisdic-
tions can add a layer of complexity. While it is true that there are funda-
mental elements in our laws that will likely never be synchronized, that
does not mean that it useless to attempt any such harmonization. Both
American and Canadian personal bankruptcy laws are premised on the
policies that creditors can do better in a collective fashion rather than
piece-meal and that there should be a means of discharging an honest
debtor in most instances.142
While both countries originally adopted many aspects of England's
law into their own systems, the United States departed from the English
system with respect to their bankruptcy laws while Canada did not.
14 3
Therefore Canada's original bankruptcy laws, like England's, were
much harsher on the debtor that in the United States."' In recent years,
however, Canada's reorganization laws have grown increasingly similar
to those here in the United States.
145
Despite recent conformities in the CCAA to the U.S. Code, there
are still significant differences between the two bankruptcy systems. For
example, in Canada there are no cramdown provisions and the sales pro-
cess differs drastically from the classic U.S. stalking-horse method.
146
Further, unlike in the United States, Canadian bankruptcy law does not
necessarily guarantee a right of discharge to a consumer debtor just
because their nonexempt assets have been sold.
147
Another aspect unique to American bankruptcy law is with respect
to the generous homestead exemptions that vary drastically from state to
state in consumer bankruptcies. For example, in Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
South Dakota, and Texas, there is no dollar limit on the amount that an
individual can claim as a homestead exemption. 148 Whether or not such
laws are good or bad, there is no doubt that similarly situated debtors
and creditors are being treated drastically different from one state to
another.
142. See Nathalie Martin, supra note 8, at 382.
143. See id. at 367.
144. See id.
145. See Sheryl Seigel, Lang Michener LLP, supra note 53 at 13 ("By reason of developing
jurisprudence and legislative changes, restructuring law and practice under the CCAA is becoming
more similar to that under Chapter II."); see also Jacob S. Ziegel, Canada's Phased-In
Bankruptcy Reforn, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 383, 387 (1996) ("Canada's bankruptcy philosophy
broadly mirrors the American philosophy.")
146. See Laurence Cozier, supra note 84, at 30; see also supra Part l.C.
147. See Jacob S. Ziegel, supra note 145, at 387.
148. See WILLIAM D. WARREN, DANIEL J. BUSSEL, AND ROBERT L. JORDAN, BANKRUPTCY 41
(7th ed. 2005).
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Many have criticized these laws as being unfair, and arguments in
favor of a uniform exemption system were once advanced that would
override the current state exemptions. 4 9 Unfortunately, opposition pre-
vented a uniform system from emerging due to the "creditors who
wanted to preserve the law in states that had low exemptions and con-
sumers in states that had more generous ones."' 50 These fairness and
consistency issues are now reappearing in the context of cross-border
cases where different countries apply different laws and have different
economic and political interests.
B. A Unique Solution: Create Internal Consistency By
Resolving Circuit Splits
One example that illustrates this problem is with the current circuit
split regarding the treatment of executory contracts under the Code,1 5 1 a
very important aspect to nearly any successful reorganization plan. Cur-
rently, there is a circuit split as to whether a debtor in possession can
assume or assign certain executory contracts depending on certain other
applicable laws.' 52 Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that a trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract "if (1)(a)
applicable law excuses a party other than the debtor or debtor in posses-
sion . . . and (B) such party does not consent to such assumption or
assignment."' 153 The interpretation of Section 365(c)(1) has divided the
circuit courts of appeal in adopting either the "hypothetical" test or the
"actual" test. The Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted the "hypothetical test" 154 while the First and Fifth Circuits have
adopted the "actual test."'
' 55
The "hypothetical test," adopts a strict interpretation of the plain
language of Section 365(c)(1). Its focus is on the language "the trustee
may not assume or assign."' 116 This reading of this phrase prohibits the
assumption of an executory contract by the debtor if applicable law pro-
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); § 365(0.
152. See, e.g., In re Matter of West Electronics Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988) (detailing the
alternative interpretations of this provision regarding the treatment of executory contracts).
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (emphasis added).
154. See In re West Electronics, Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Sunterra Corporation,
361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004); In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); In
re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994).
155. See In re Summit Investment and Development Co., 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995); In re
Institut Pasteur, 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Mirant Co., 440 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2006).
156. See § 365(c) (emphasis added); See also Paul Battista, Nina Greene & Glenn D. Moses,
May a Franchisor Veto a Franchisee's Assumption of a Franchise Agreement in Bankruptcy?
28-SUM FRANCHISE L.J. 16, 17 (2008).
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vides that the nondebtor does not have to accept performance from a
third party. This test is hypothetical because the debtor may only be
trying to assume and not assign the franchise agreement, yet this
assumption would be prohibited because "applicable law" prohibits such
assignment. 57 Opponents of this test argue that this literal interpretation
is inconsistent with the objectives of the Code, and have come up with
various arguments to avoid the harsh results of the hypothetical test.
158
Under the "actual test," the courts presuppose that the "or" is really
an "and" because the literal reading of the language may produce some
results that conflict with the policies behind the Bankruptcy Code.' 59 If
the court uses the "actual test," they will make a case-by-case inquiry
into whether the nondebtor party is actually being forced to accept per-
formance from someone other than the debtor party with whom it origi-
nally contracted. 160 While this approach has been criticized because it
departs from the plain meaning of the language, and it is up to Congress,
not the courts to legislate, the actual test offers a more functional inter-
pretation of the Code.'61 Under the actual test, Section 365(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code does not serve as an obstacle in assuming a contract
where no assignment of that contract is actually being contemplated.
162
Regardless of what industry you are in, the treatment of executory
contracts forms a key component of whether a debtor can emerge from
Chapter 11 and ultimately become profitable again. For instance, Sec-
tion 365(c)(1) has been applied to personal service contracts, partnership
and limited-liability-company agreements, joint-venture agreements,
intellectual-property and technological licenses, franchise agreements,
and government contracts.1 63 In the franchising context, a jurisdiction
that uses the hypothetical test reaches a result whereby a franchisor can
basically veto its franchisee's ability to assume its own franchise agree-
ment if the franchisee were to file for bankruptcy.1" Thus, a franchisee
would be much better off in a jurisdiction that employs the actual test.
The reverse would apply for franchisors.
These inconsistencies incentivize forum shopping and further com-
plicate matters when foreign creditors are involved. No matter how
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much cooperation is attempted, when the results under one bankruptcy
system differ greatly from the results that would be obtained under a
different bankruptcy system, the battle for jurisdiction is going to be
fierce. On the other hand, if each of the different potential jurisdictions
applied the same laws, there would naturally be less forum shopping and
less funds of the debtor's estate spent litigating these matters. The only
way to eliminate this problem is to level the playing field as much as
possible by taking away the competitive advantages that derive from
forum shopping.
This problem regarding the inconsistent treatment of executory
contracts came up in the recent case of Raddison Design Management
Inc. v. Cummins.165 In that case, there was a dispute over whether the
debtor, Technomarine, could assign its floating dock delivery contract
that it had made with its general contractor, Bob Cummins Construction
Company. 166 On April 25, 2006, the provincial bankruptcy court of Que-
bec approved the sale of all of Technomarine's assets to the Plaintiff
Raddison Design Management, including its contract with Cummins.
167
When Raddison filed an action in U.S. District court seeking payment
under the subcontract as an assignee, Cummins filed a motion to dismiss
stating that "the assignment of the contract was invalid as a matter of
state, federal and international law."' 168 Cummins argued that the assign-
ment authorized by the Quebec court should not be afforded comity
because to do so would violate Pennsylvania public policy which recog-
nizes that a right "may not be effectively assigned where such assign-
ment is prohibited by the writing creating the right."
' 169
Pennsylvania law will not recognize a foreign judgment which vio-
lates "a positive, well-defined universal public sentiment, deeply inte-
grated in the customs and beliefs of the people."' 70 Nevertheless, the
Raddison court held that "the enforcement or non-enforcement of a con-
tractual non-assignment clause does implicate issues which are so injuri-
ous or critical to public health and morals as to trigger the narrowly
defined public policy exception."' 17 1 As a result, Cummins would have
165. See Raddison Design Management, Inc. v. Cummins, C.A. No. 07-92 Erie, 2008 WL
55998, (W.D.Pa. Jan 3, 2008).
166. See id. at *1.
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170. See id.; See also Somportex v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161, 168
(Pa. 1970). in Somportex, the appellant sought to have an English judgment declared
unenforceable because it included damages for loss of good will and attorney's fees, both of
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ruling that the English judgment did not violate public policy.
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been forced to perform under the contract even if the District court had
found Cummins to be correct on the merits. 7 2 Cummins would have had
no redress even if his interpretation was meritorious.
The lack of any uniform law regarding the treatment of executory
contracts in the United States might have led the Quebec Bankruptcy
court to come up with its own interpretation regarding Section 365, even
though it should have been applying Pennsylvania's interpretation.' 73 If
the circuit split were eliminated, there is a greater chance that a foreign
court would apply the correct interpretation of U.S. law, which would
make the overall administration of cross-border cases more manageable
and less complex.
Especially between the United States and Canada, where there is a
long history of cooperation and doing business together, there are cer-
tainly opportunities to create more uniformity and transparency between
the two countries.' 7 4 While there are certainly fundamental differences
between the two countries, one action that can be taken without compro-
mising state sovereignty is to resolve certain inconsistencies regarding
the application of laws internally.
V. CONCLUSION
If the trend is for the United States to recognize foreign proceed-
ings with the utmost of deference, there is an element of control that is
lost by having the laws of another country decide certain aspects of a
proceeding that might come out differently under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. The only way to help ensure that result will come out the same in
another jurisdiction is to make the substantive laws more similar. The
more similar the laws, the less likely it is that there will be forum shop-
ping, the greater chance that a flawed COMI test will not cause any
undue hardship, and the easier it will be to cooperate and utilize the
principles and policies that were agreed upon in the Transnational Insol-
vency Project. '
75
This solution might prove futile in the context of UNCITRAL
because it would require creating a somewhat harmonized system of
laws for the majority of countries around the world. However, because
the United States and Canada are so similar in culture and existing laws,
it makes sense to examine each other's substantive laws and make spe-
172. See id. The court ultimately disagreed, holding that Cummins' argument that the
assignment was prohibited to be "belied by the statutory history of §365."
173. See id. at *2, n.2 ("the parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs the substantive issues
in this case.").
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cific legislative reforms that will facilitate cross-border insolvencies and
use of the Guidelines.
When economic conditions are difficult like they are now, countries
might be less inclined to extend comity to a foreign proceeding unless it
is also in the interest of domestic creditors. We have seen from the Rad-
dison case some of the dangers that can result when a court is forced to
interpret the laws of another jurisdiction, especially when those laws are
unclear. Up to date, bankruptcy courts on both sides of the border have
done a commendable job in dealing with these cross-border issues
despite the lack of uniformity and clear guidance.
At an American Bar Association Conference in September 2009,
Justice Farley attributed much of the recent successes to the extra effortsof the judiciary.176 He argued that some of these recent cases demon-
strate that progress can be achieved without any need for legislative
action. 177 While it may be true that a trend seems to be emerging that
promotes international cooperation in a bankruptcy setting, especially
between the United States and Canada, even Justice Farley admits that
there are still cases where "particular courts overlook trends in interna-
tional co-ordination."
1 78
The best way to make proceedings more efficient and predictable is
by seeking more unity in U.S. laws and by staying proactive in updating
any outdated laws. The circuit split regarding how to treat executory
contracts is one example where there seems to be room for a workable
solution. While different interpretations may be justified by different
policies behind the Bankruptcy Code, circuit splits should be resolved
with an overriding policy consideration in mind of facilitating the opera-
tion of global business.
176. See The Honourable James M. Farley, supra note 11, at 49.
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